CIA Director John Ratcliffe ordered the retraction or "substantive revision" of 19 intelligence assessments on Friday, concluding that reports produced over the past decade failed to meet the agency's own standards for analytical rigor and political independence. The President's Intelligence Advisory Board identified the flagged reports after reviewing hundreds of assessments, and an internal review led by Deputy Director Michael Ellis reached the same conclusion.
Three of the redacted assessments were released publicly. Their topics tell you everything you need to know about where the CIA's analytical focus drifted during the years in question.
According to Fox News, one report, published in October 2021, examined women in overseas groups promoting violence rooted in the belief that "an idealized white European identity is under threat." Another, released near the end of the Obama administration, assessed government crackdowns on LGBT communities in the Middle East and concluded those policies were "likely influenced by conservative public opinion" and "hindered U.S. initiatives supporting LGBT rights." A third, published in July 2020, concluded that the COVID-19 pandemic was limiting contraceptive access in developing countries and could "undermine efforts to address population pressures affecting economic development."
These were not threat assessments. They were not actionable intelligence. They read like policy advocacy dressed in the language of national security analysis. The CIA was producing reports about contraceptive supply chains and the political opinions of Middle Eastern governments toward LGBT activists while adversaries abroad were watching, waiting, and planning.
Let that sink in.
Ratcliffe did not mince words in his public statement:
"The intelligence products we released to the American people today — produced before my tenure as DCIA — fall short of the high standards of impartiality that CIA must uphold and do not reflect the expertise for which our analysts are renowned."
He went further, stating there is "absolutely no room for bias" in the agency's work, and that when "analytic rigor has been compromised," the CIA carries a responsibility to correct the record. He framed the retractions as a demonstration of transparency and accountability, not a purge.
That framing matters. Critics, including unnamed former officials cited by the New York Times, argued the assessments simply "reflected policy priorities of previous administrations." That argument, examined honestly, does not exonerate the reports. It confirms the problem. Intelligence analysis is supposed to be independent of policy priorities. The moment an assessment starts reflecting an administration's agenda rather than ground truth, it stops being intelligence and starts being something else entirely.
A senior administration official told the Times that many of the remaining 16 flagged reports involved diversity, equity, and inclusion issues. That finding points to something broader than a few bad reports. It points to an institutional culture that, over the course of a decade, allowed ideological priorities to shape what the agency studied, how it framed its conclusions, and what it chose to flag as a threat.
The three released reports span three administrations, which is worth noting. One landed during the Obama years, one during the first Trump term, and one during Biden's tenure. The apparatus that produced this kind of analysis was not installed overnight, and it did not disappear between administrations. Career analysts, institutional habits, and entrenched assumptions about what constitutes a national security concern built this record report by report.
That is a structural problem, not a partisan one. But it is a problem that requires political will to confront, and that will is now being applied.
The CIA's own stated mission is objective intelligence analysis on national security issues. The agency itself acknowledged the flagged assessments "did not meet CIA and IC analytic tradecraft standards and failed to be independent of political consideration." That is not an outside accusation. That is the institution's own verdict on its own work.
Deputy Director Michael Ellis led an internal review that reached identical conclusions to the President's Intelligence Advisory Board. Two separate processes, the same finding. The reports failed.
Former officials who challenged the declassification decision are entitled to their view. What they cannot credibly argue is that reports defending their policy preferences are automatically sound intelligence. That circular logic is precisely what Ratcliffe is dismantling.
Nineteen assessments have been addressed. Hundreds more were reviewed to find them. The scope of the initial review does not suggest the problem ends here, and Ratcliffe has signaled that the commitment to transparency and accountability extends beyond this announcement.
The CIA exists to tell decision-makers hard truths about a dangerous world. When it redirects that capacity toward producing advocacy documents on contraceptive access or ideological assessments about domestic political opinion abroad, it is not just wasting resources. It is eroding the credibility that makes its actual intelligence valuable.
Ratcliffe is rebuilding that credibility. The retractions are the proof of work.